**BULGARIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION CRISIS**

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**Abstract:** This article is devoted to the analysis of Bulgarian-Turkish relations, especially since 2013. It was then that the world saw an unprecedented influx of illegal immigrants, trying to reach Western Europe or Scandinavia. Also in 2013, the process of streamlining controls within the Bulgarian-Turkish border was initiated. There was therefore a fully justified fear of the parallel deterioration of relations between strategic partners. In addition to the discussed political rhetoric in bilateral relations, the author focuses on the divergent priorities of Turkey and the EU, which puts Bulgaria in a difficult situation. Bulgaria, due to its geographical location, was naturally "manoeuvred" into the need to bear responsibility for the effects of the migration crisis.

**Keywords:** Bulgarian-Turkish border, EU-Turkey readmission agreement, EU-Turkey relations, illegal immigration, European migrant crisis

**INTRODUCTION**

Before Bulgaria and Turkey saw the consequences of the migrant crisis provoked by the events in Syria and tensions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the relations between both countries were focused on such aspects as: considerable strengthening of Turkish interests in the Balkan region, size of foreign trade, proper communication between decision makers in both countries and the development of the infrastructure connecting Istanbul and Sofia, there were also some history related debates because of the grievances connected with the negatively perceived expansion of the Ottoman Empire which had impact also on Bulgaria. The migration issues observed in Bulgarian-Turkish relations over the centuries were connected with the consent to admit ethnic Turkish immigrants from Balkan countries to the Republic of Turkey, established after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, or a lack of such consent. Certainly, these issues were accompanied by various antinomies resulting from the Turkish opposition to the situation of the Turkish minority living in Bulgaria. According to the Bulgarians, the diaspora, strongly supported by Turkey, was sometimes used to interfere with Bulgarian internal politics. However, after the end of the Cold War and during the disintegration process of Yugoslavia, migrants who were ethnically related to Turkey were joined by Bulgarians looking for shelter and better paid jobs in Turkey. This labour migration trend directed from Bulgaria to Turkey was reversed when in the former country the democratisation process was started and when after over ten year it became a European Union member state [1].

However, contemporary migration models were transformed. Today the divergence in the Bulgarian-Turkish interests is not so much related only to the presence of the Turkish minority in the Bulgarian territory or the changes in the labour migration trend observed since the 90s among the citizens of these
neighbouring countries, as the uncontrolled influx of migrants from third countries. Apart from the fact that the relations between both countries have become quite tense due to the consequences of events taking places beyond their borders, the real influence on Bulgarian-Turkish relations is exerted by the actions of yet another actor – the European Union. The divergence of the priorities of Turkey and the EU puts Bulgaria in a difficult position because, due to its geographical location, it was “manoeuvred” in a natural way to the necessity to take the responsibility for the consequences of the migrant crisis. After the decision not to honour the promise made in 2016 to liberalise the visa regime for Turkish citizens, Turkey issued threats leading to realistic fears about the possibility of opening the borders for a few millions of refugees staying in its territory near the border with the EU states. This situation initiated a discussion in Bulgaria about threats issued by its eastern neighbour. There were also voices that the state would not bear the burden of a new wave of migrants due to financial and institutional restriction which would make it impossible to ensure security and basic living conditions for millions of asylum seekers. The above described situation would force Bulgaria to shift the responsibility for the mass influx of people to other states in the region, which would lead to further crossings of the Balkan transit route leading to Germany, Austria and some other Western European states and Scandinavia [2].

As a result, at present one of the greatest challenges faced to ensure security and, for this reason, introduce effective mechanisms regulating the flow of migrants crossing the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, are the relations with Turkey as it neighbours war-torn Syria. Hence, a question arises whether the necessity to protect Bulgarian borders and the borders of other European countries will Bulgaria to introduce the unavoidable, real ‘separation’ from its most important strategic partner - the Republic of Turkey.

I. SITUATION ON THE BULGARIAN-TURKISH BORDER AFTER 2013

Pursuant to the decision made in 2013 by the governing bodies in Bulgaria, the process of tightening border controls on the border with Turkey was started. The activity of security services there was increased, which resulted from the fact that the said route was the most popular one among asylum seekers planning to enter the Bulgarian territory. In 2013, in comparison with the previous year, it was observed over 600% increase in illegal attempts to cross the border from Turkey, and only in 2014 Bulgarian authorities stopped 38,500 people who were trying to illegally cross this border, it should also be noted here that 93% of migrants on the Bulgarian-Turkish border arrived by land, 5% of the stopped migrants were trying to cross the Greek-Turkish border in the place neighbouring with the Bulgarian territory so as to be admitted to Bulgaria in the Kapitan Andreewo border checkpoint. Interestingly, 2%, supported by Turkish traffickers, came by the Black Sea. Although currently the security of the Bulgarian coastline seems to be unaffected by the situation, the number of transfers of migrants from third countries may increase. Hence, there is a risk that the increase in the number of migrants remaining near Turkish borders will lead to the development of human trafficking business also in this area. Similar cases were also observed in Bulgaria’s close neighbourhood, i.e. on the Romanian coast, where in September this year two fishing boats carrying 200 immigrants from Iraq and Iran were discovered [3].
Taking into account the fact that there is a growing migration pressure exerted by Turkey, within whose borders, according to Turkish records, there are nearly 3 million Syrians and thousands of Afghans and Iraqis, on November 11, 2013, in cooperation with the police and the Directorate General of Border Police, the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it was decided to block the Bulgarian-Turkish border by introducing border patrol comprising 1663 policemen, thanks to this each kilometre of this popular route was monitored by two guards. People intending to enter the Bulgarian territory were systematically sent back to Turkey. The necessity to tighten border patrols control resulted from disturbing statistical data reaching the State Agency for Refugees. According to Bulgarian decision makers, since 2013 the state has become a temporary shelter not only for Syrian asylum seekers, but also for Afghans, Moroccans, Tunisians, Algerians and Malians who were interested in economic immigration heading for Western Europe or Scandinavia (the data took into account the fact that the country as only a transit place for the migrants) [4].

In October 2013 Bulgaria started to build the first part of 33-km fence to separate itself from the Turkish territory. Interestingly, as a result of recognising the uncontrolled migration as a threat for the state stability, given the fact that it has not been admitted to the Schengen area, it made some controversial decisions contrary to the accepted EU policies. Initially barbed wire was used in mountainous and wooded area which was a popular route used to smuggle migrants due to the fact that it was hard to control it using the video surveillance system employed on the Bulgarian-Turkish border. It was assumed that if immigrants are forced to reach indicated control points, it will be easier for Bulgaria to efficiently control the border situation, especially given the shortage of funds, and to minimise the number of asylum seekers who were forced to force their way in such a difficult terrain. The construction the consecutive fragments of the fence was completed in April 2015. It is this fence, 160 km long and 4.5 km high, secured additionally with barbed wire, that covers only a part of the 240-km Bulgarian-Turkish border and was one of the first “walls” in Europe supposed to solve the problem of illegal migration or at least reduce it [5].

However, the decision of the Bulgarian parliament encountered violent reaction from Turkey. In 2015 the Governor of the Edirne Province, Dursun Ali Şahin, who met with the Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Internal Affairs Rumyana Bachvarova, expressed concerns related to the plans to continue building the fence of the Bulgarian-Turkish border. The Governor admitted that Turkey insisted on the removal of the fence and stated that this is why the barbed wire may hinder positive, neighbourly relations between both countries. During the meeting with the Governor, Rumyana Bachvarova argued that the decision of the Bulgarian parliament was necessary to protect the Bulgarian territory from the influx of migrants and also thanked for cooperation in the protection of the border between both countries. Simultaneously the Bulgarian Minister emphasised the significance of bilateral trade relations whose decrease would have a negative impact of the economic situation of both states [6].

Another fact which deserves attention is that the plan to build the fence did not receive unanimous approval in Bulgaria itself. According to Krassimir Kanev, Chairman of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, the intensification of border controls, including 24-hour monitoring and the introduction of the said control points, in the long term perspective may result in an increase in the activity of
criminal groups involved in migrant smuggling. The restrictive migration policy introduced by Bulgaria will support only those who can afford to pay for transit in a “crowded, hidden truck compartment on a hot summer day” [7]. Moreover in 2013 the Secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Svetlozar Lazarov claimed that closing the Bulgarian-Turkish border completely will not so much put the lives of immigrants at risk, as it would be a political decision breaking the international regulations and agreements in this respect which are binding for the Republic of Bulgaria [8]. The said regulation encompassed the 1951 Refugee Convention [9] and the Protocol Related to Status of Refugees signed in 1967 [10]. Pursuant to these documents Bulgaria was obliged to offer humanitarian aid and grant a refugee status regardless of the country of origin. Contrary to Bulgaria, Turkey made reservations in the above documents and accepted only the applications of asylum seekers coming from European countries. On account of that, according to the Bulgarian News Agency ‘Novinite’, immigrants from third countries were allowed to enter the Turkish territory but they had to leave it later. At the same time Bulgaria was supposed to meet its obligations. The procedures introduced in this state were particularly related to the detailed verification of admitted immigrants, which was made difficult due to the fact that numerous immigrants did not have appropriate documents. However, thanks to the access to the Schengen Information System (SIS) and the Interpol Information System attempts were made to verify the identity of immigrants and those of them who were considered not to endanger state security were offered shelter in overcrowded open camps, one of which was the camp in Harmanli. In situation when there was any risk that an immigrant could be involved in international criminal structures or terrorist organisations, such a citizen of a third country was located in closed camps for one year until the matter of their possible involvement in such structures was clarified [11].

Contrary to the assertions of Svetlozar Lazarov related to maintain high security levels and the compliance of all procedures with human rights protection, since 2013 several times the public opinion informed not only about tightened border controls on the Bulgarian-Turkish border, but also about the abuse of law by Bulgarian security forces. One Syrian female immigrant, staying with her family in the Harmanli camp, reported that when they had entered the Bulgarian territory, the police used physical violence against them. This was not the only case reported in this respect. Over the last few years, there have been reports on the brutality of Bulgarian officials who not only used corporal punishment and psychological humiliation, but also stole immigrants’ mobile phones and money. Each attempt to cross the border was reported to Turkish agencies which were obliged to admit deported immigrants. It is estimated that in 2016 about 150–200 immigrants were forced to return to Turkey every day [12].

II. THE INFLUENCE OF THE EU-TURKISH RELATIONS ON THE POSITION OF BULGARIA

When Bulgaria was applying for NATO membership, it was strongly supported by Turkey. When over ten years ago Turkey was concluding the association agreement with the EU, Bulgaria also supported it during the accession negotiations as it was certain that it was still possible to strengthen the already friendly relations with a state sharing European values, increase Turkish stability and lift the burden of maintaining the external EU border form the state. In 2016,
however, Bulgaria partly changed its attitude to the issue of Turkish integration with the EU structures, which resulted from the fact that some obligations related to the influx of immigrants form the Balkan route naturally had already been moved to the ‘buffer state’ (a name now used to refer to Turkey). According to Bianca Benvenuti, on the one hand, it strengthened the position of the country as the ‘guard of Europe’, on the other hand though, the migration problems in turkey became a real obstacle in resuming accession negotiations. As a result, the Turkey-EU relations, directly related also to Bulgaria itself, were based on three very important issues: liberalisation of the visa regime to enable Turkish citizens to enter the EU territory; illegal migration from third countries to the EU member states across Turkey and the Turkish minority living in the EU [13].

For many years the priority in the relations between the EU and Turkey was the conclusion of the readmission agreement, which took place on December 16, 2013 when Turkey accepted the EU conditions in return for the liberalisation of the visa regime lifting restrictions in travelling to the Schengen area states for Turkish citizens. This issue was especially important, among others, because of the existence of 4.5m Turkish diaspora. In return for lifting visa requirements, the state undertook the obligation to admit illegal immigrants crossing the Turkish border on their way to EU countries, in addition to this, the extradition of the citizens of the Republic of Turkey was supposed to take place right after the ratification of the agreement, and for the citizens of third countries within three years form the effective date. Brussels planned to assign the amount of EUR 3bn for this purpose for Turkey. Turkey was also obliged to prepare the roadmap encompassing 72 criteria of public order, security and the rule of law. Finally the agreement was to take effect in June 2016 and the liberation of the visa regime for Turkish citizens was to take place in October the same year. In March 2016 it was additionally decided that after March 20, all illegal immigrants crossing the Greek border would also be returned to Turkey, the EU would accept a Syrian citizen staying in the Turkish territory in return for the possibility to extradite another Syrian citizens staying one of the Greek islands. In return for this Brussels was obliged to pay another EUR 3bn and accelerate the visa requirements lifting process so it would become effective before June 2016. Especially the EU idea of the ‘one to one’ exchange was heavily criticised by a number of international organisations protecting human rights. The criticism of this controversial solution, called ‘refugee trade’ by its opponents, did not take it into account that according to Turkish data, the territory of this country was inhabited by about 3 thousand Syrian refugees, however, it is hard to prove the credibility of the presented statistics. The number of migrants who were supposed to be exchanged could be much larger. Another mistake made by Brussels was the fact that it did not negotiate the possibility to controlling how the assigned funding is spent [14].

To guarantee Bulgaria the possibility to implement the agreement, in May 2016 the Bulgarian and Turkish ministers of internal affairs signed a protocol confirming the earlier established cooperation and procedures, and hence this document replaced the 1967 agreement. The protocol did not predict granting Bulgaria any other additional rights, it only specified human rights protection procedures with reference to people returned to Turkey. However, after Erdoğan’s political cleansing, in return for the coup attempt made in July 2016, the intensified conflict with the Kurds and a number of terrorist attacks, it became clear that the complete implementation of the recommendation included in the roadmap did not
take place. As a result, the European Commission explicitly objected to the liberalisation of the visa regime, in return Erdoğan threatened to open the EU border and ‘flood’ the EU member states with millions of refugees. Because of this the protocol signed by Bulgaria was not ratified as it was rejected by the Turkish party [15].

Then Brussels had face a difficult choice of either lifting visa requirements for Turkish citizens or to terminate the agreement with Ankara. The former would lead to the increase in the size of the already large Turkish diaspora in which there would also be place for refugees with falsified Turkish documents, which would probably be easy to obtain in corruption infected Turkey. The latter would mean returning to the events of 2014 and no possibility to counteract any such extensive migration wave. No matter which of these solution would be chosen by Brussels, in both cases the state which would take the most devastating consequences of the EU politics would be Bulgaria [16]. Although, according to the statistical data collected by the Bulgarian security services, the ratification of the 2016 agreement between the EU and Turkey did not have a significant influence on the size and structure of illegal migration from Turkey to Bulgaria, complete breaking negotiations with Turkey and destructing partner relations with this country would not save Bulgaria from the increased flow of immigrants even if the Bulgarian security services were put on highest alert level [17].

III. POLITICAL RHETORIC

On the basis of the recent events, it might seem that the Bulgarian confidence to its Turkish neighbour was put to a serious test, however, regardless of what happened, the Bulgarian Government seems to maintain a moderate attitude to Turkey as it is afraid of a possible influx of immigrants or Erdoğan’s hostile politics. The Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov officially admitted that for Bulgaria also safe, partner trade relations are a significant factor. For many years Turkish businessmen were attracted to Bulgaria where their investments are estimated to be worth about USD 2bn. Turkey itself is considered one of the most important trade partners in this country. In this situation the weakening of the Turkish investment sector in Bulgaria would hinder the development of this country in the consecutive years, and one has to bear in mind that even now this state is challenged by numerous social and economic problems. The complexity of the situation in Bulgaria practically means that it has to strengthen its position in the EU and simultaneously care for its bilateral relations with Turkey [18].

The essential confirmation of the will to maintain good relations with turkey is the statement made by Boyko Borisov in 2016 when the Prime Minister observed that for Bulgaria the only way of counteracting the consequences of the migrant crisis is the implementation of actions coordinated with its eastern neighbour. For Borisov the migration policy of particular EU states does not offer positive perspectives to adopt a common position against the increasing threats resulting from the mass influx of the citizens of third countries to the EU territory, because it remains the resultant of action undertaken by countries which only try to shift the responsibility for the consequences of the crisis to one another [19]. It should be mentioned that these words were said in gratitude to the support which can be by Turkey as it is the only way for illegal immigrants to return to their countries of origin. In 2015 the Governor of Edirne Dursun Ali Şahin in his statement made for
CNNTurk claimed that Ankara did not allow migrants to cross the EU borders (with Bulgaria and Greece) because they did not receive any formal ‘invitation’ [20], however, a few days later near Edirne, a city neighbouring Greece and Bulgaria barricades were made to block the possibility to leave Turkey and, simultaneously, new assertions related to the deportation of illegal immigrants were made [21].

However, maintain good neighbourly relations with Turkey requires Bulgaria to meet the Turkish requirements imposed on Bulgaria in August 2016. This refers to the controversial issue of Abdullah Büyük. Although two Bulgarian courts ruled to grant him political asylum, the Ministry of Internal Affairs decided to deport the man and hand him over to the Turkish authorities. Abdullah Büyük, who had stayed in Bulgaria since the end of 2015, was accused of supporting Fethullah Gülen, an Islamic spiritual leader, connected with the US intelligence and allegedly responsible for the organisation of the military coup in July 2016. Boyko Borisov himself admitted that the Turkish demands were met due to the necessity to counteract ‘flooding’ Bulgaria with the migration wave. However the case of Abdullah Büyük was not the only situation of this kind. Bulgarian secret services handed over to Turkey seven other people (they all belonged to academic and journalistic circles) who supposedly maintained contacts with Gülen. Hence, there were some voices that Bulgaria, instead of tightening the cooperation with the EU being its member state, succumbs to Erdoğan and that it should face trial in the European judicial organs for breaking human rights [22].

Apart from the challenges resulting from attempts to counteract the consequences of the migrant crisis, the Bulgarian-Turkish relations are also complicated by the accusations of trying to influence the internal politics of Bulgaria. For Ognyan Minchev, the director of the Institute of Regional and International studies in Sofia, it was clear that Brussels decides to grant Tukey EU membership, Bulgaria will probably not be able to set free from the Turkish ‘expansive policy orbit’, which will result in increased interventions in Bulgarian internal affairs [23]. The matter is made even more complex by the fact that in Bulgaria there is the DOST – Democrats for Responsibility, Solidarity and Tolerance whose leader is Lyutvi Mestan, the former head of the DPS – Movement for Rights and Freedoms who was accused of escalating the Turkish-Russian conflict in 2015. Similarly to DPS, the new party maintains a pro-Turkish position due to its close relations with the Justice and Development Party headed by President Erdoğan, it also represents the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The lack of permission for the intervention in the Bulgarian politics was revealed, e.g. in March 2017 when three allied parties of the United Patriots – the Bulgarian National Movement (IMRO), the National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB) and Attack organised a protest by blocking the border checkpoint in Kapitan Andreewo to prevent Bulgarian Turks from entering Bulgaria as they wanted to influence the result of the coming parliamentary election by voting for DOST. According to unofficial data, about 50,000 people were transported to Bulgaria from Turkey by coach. However, the result of the March election did not allow Lyutvi Mestan to exceed the 15% DPS result from 2014, and DOST had only 3% support and thus did not receive a single mandate [24].

Regardless of various conflicting matters in Bulgarian-Turkish relations, it is worth noting that the political dialogue is maintained thanks to regular meetings between high level officials. In 2013 and 2014 an exchange of views between the misters of foreign affairs of both countries was initiated and at the beginning of 2015 Boyko Borisov visited Istanbul, at the end of the same year he received the
Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu with a group of ministers and MPs in Sofia. In addition to this, Borisov regularly maintains telephone contacts with President Erdogan. One of the more recent ones, in 2017, was connected with the discussed bilateral cooperation for border security during the migrant crisis in Europe and the EU-Turkish relations whose development is especially important for Bulgarian interests. It seems obvious that the Bulgarian-Turkish border cooperation is especially important after 2013 and is largely based on intensified actions undertaken by Bulgaria which really needs the uniform procedures of sending refugees back to Turkey also via the EU. However, it should be noted that Ankara also pursues the goal of maintaining positive relations with its Bulgarian neighbour [25]. It is in the interest of Turkey to play a key role in the Balkan region, it is the consequence of its historical dominance in this region. Moreover, for both Bulgaria and Turkey the priority is strengthening economic integration. Turkish investments not only contribute to the development in Bulgaria, but also strengthen Turkish economic influence. For Turkey it is also especially important to protect the ‘Turkish heritage’ which is shaped by the Muslim minority living in Bulgaria [26].

The maintenance of active political contacts with Bulgaria led to the support for the Turkish concept of minimising the number of Syrian citizens seeking shelter in Europe. A plan presented by President Erdogan assumed the creation of a security zone in Syria in which refugees coming back to their homeland could settle. However, this was connected with the risk of organising a territorial ‘base’ for the government opposition in Syria in the area which is free from any military action. In 2015, when Prime Minister Borisov applied for the Bulgarian presidency in the Council of the European Union, he promised to support President Erdogan’s initiative on the international arena as he believed that this concept would restrict the influx of illegal immigrants to Bulgaria [27].

The first Bulgarian presidency in the Council of the European Union European Council was officially started at the beginning of January 2018. The priorities listed by Boyko Borisov for the period of the rotational presidency encompassed the necessity to play an active role in the process of developing the solidarity and cohesion in the EU, develop harmonise migration policy by individual member states. At the same time the Prime Minister assumed that the position of Bulgaria has to lead to the improvement of the EU-Turkey dialogue. Clearly defined relations with Ankara are important because they contribute to strengthening economic cooperation, also in the energy sector, and they counteract illegal immigration and terrorism. During its presidency, Sofia will try to remind Brussels about the significance of Turkey and will make every effort to discipline Turkey to introduce and observe every aspect of the rule of law which does not arrest journalists, admitted Borisov [28].

CONCLUSION

Although initially the construction of the wall on the Bulgarian-Turkish border did not seem to favourably received by Bulgaria’s eastern neighbour, most probably in the future the investment will not be the bone of contention in the bilateral relations between both countries because a similar solution was used by Turkey to protect the Turkish-Syrian border which will be separated with a 911-km wall in spring 2018 [29]. However, it cannot be excluded that the real ‘wall’ understood as the principal obstacle in in shaping positive Bulgarian-Turkish
relations in longer perspective will result from taking responsibility by Turkey for slowing the flow of immigrants, which, according to Ankara, is conditioned particularly by contacts with EU. In the negotiation of the readmission agreement, Brussels did not decide to accept Turkish conditions simultaneously reversing earlier decisions, which led to doubts of the Turkish side whether it should continue negotiating its membership. On the other hand the very issue of Turkish EU accession raises numerous doubts. Given the fact that there are no harmonised EU actions, Turkey will not be able to take responsibility for the areas affected by the migrant crisis. Additionally the current EY-Turkey relations make the scenario of cooperation based on mutual trust less probable along with discouraging Turkey from taking appropriate measures to protect the EU from the mass influx of immigrants.

Hence, Bulgaria, which is still under the EU control, will face the additional challenge of playing the role of a stable mediator in the EU–Turkey relations in such a way that the consequences of the location of the transit route in the Balkans do not mean broken relation with both of these actors so important for the state. Moreover, the analysis of the political rhetoric of Bulgarian and Turkish decision makers leads to the conclusion that the consequences of the migrant crisis jeopardise the bilateral relations between both states, however, both Bulgaria and Turkey want to maintain partner relations. When cooperation with Turkey for Bulgaria is an alternative for contacts with EU countries, Turkey treats is as a ‘bridge’ leading to integration with EU partners [30].

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RELACJE BUŁGARSKO–TURECKIE W OBLICZU WSPÓŁCZESNEGO KRYZYSU MIGRACYJNEGO

Streszczenie: Niniejszy artykuł autorka poświęca analizie relacji bułgarsko–tureckich, szczególnie od 2013 r. To właśnie w tym roku zaobserwowano bezprecedensowy napływ nielegalnych imigrantów, którzy po pokonaniu granicy z Turcją, w dalszej kolejności przez Bułgarię czy Grecję próbowali dotrzeć do Europy Zachodniej czy Skandynawii. Również w 2013 r. rozpoczęto proces usprawniania kontroli w obrębie granicy bułgarsko–tureckiej. Pojawiła się zatem uzasadniona obawa o równoległe pogarszanie stosunków między strategicznymi partnerami. Oprócz omawianej retoryki politycznej w relacjach dwustronnych autorka szczególną uwagę koncentruje na rozbieżnych priorytetach Turcji i UE, co stawia w trudnej sytuacji Bułgarię, która z uwagi na swoje położenie geograficzne została w naturalny sposób „wmanewrowana” w konieczność ponoszenia odpowiedzialności za skutki kryzysu migracyjnego.

Słowa kluczowe: granica bułgarsko–turecka, umowa o readmisji UE–Turcja, relacje UE–Turcja, nielegalna imigracja, europejski kryzys migracyjny